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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent and unsettling trend among today's teenagers is cyberbullying.
Cyberbullying is similar to traditional bullying, but it takes place through an
electronic medium such as social networking websites.' As an alternative to
fistfights, these bullies taunt or threaten their victims, spreading rumors, and
even making sexually explicit comments.2 The victims of cyberbullying are
often teased at school as a result of the information posted online.3
Cyberbullying can have such an intense psychological effect on its victims
that some commit suicide due, at least in part, to the severity of bullying that
occurs online and at school.4 Because of this undesirable phenomenon, many
look to the law to provide some regulation in this area. In re Rolando S. is a
case decided by California's Fifth District Court of Appeals that utilizes a
unique method to deal with cyberbullying.5 The court made cyberbullying
punishable as Felony Identity Theft under certain circumstances. 6 The court
analyzed whether a minor-who received an unsolicited text message con-
taining the victim's e-mail password and used it to access the victim's
Facebook account, change her profile information, and post inappropriate
comments on others' accounts in the victim's name-violated the identity
theft provision of the California Penal Code.7
The State of California charged the appellant with violating Section
530.5(a) of the California Penal Code.8 The juvenile court found the appel-
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1. What is Cyberbullying?, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, http://
www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited Oct. 9,
2011).
2. Id.
3. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying: Identification, Preven-
tion, and Response, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER, 1 (2010) http://www.
cyberbullying.us/CyberbullyingIdentificationPreventionResponseFact_
Sheet.pdf.
4. Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary:
Cyberbullying and Suicide, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CENTER, 1 (2010)
http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying,-and suicideresearchfactsheet.
pdf.
5. See in re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
6. Id. at 52-53.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a) (West 2008); Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
8. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
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lant guilty of the felony.9 Due to a prior offense, the maximum available
sentence was three years and three months. The appellant, however, was only
put on probation and sent to a juvenile detention program for a period of
ninety days to one year.10
This case presents a new approach to combating cyberbullying among
teenagers. By making such actions punishable as Felony Identity Theft, the
California court presents a potentially effective way to deter teenagers from
tormenting their peers by making hacking into Facebook accounts and post-
ing vulgar and embarrassing comments in someone else's name a serious
offense. Section 32261 of the California Education Code (Section 32261)
was amended on July 8, 2011, to reflect California's recognition of cyberbul-
lying.], Section 32261 describes the state legislature's intent to include
within the definition of "bullying" acts "committed ... by means of an elec-
tronic act, which includes the posting of messages on a social network In-
ternet Web site."12 Additionally, Section 48900(r) of the Education Code
empowers schools to discipline students who "[e]ngage[ ] in an act of bully-
ing, including . . . bullying committed by means of an electronic act," as
described in Section 32261.13 These sections demonstrate the California leg-
islature's desire to prevent cyberbullying among teenagers by making it pun-
ishable under California law.
Although there are many potentially positive effects of this decision, it
is easy to see the difficulty of achieving similar outcomes across the nation.
The California court relies heavily on its determination that Section
530.5(a)'s requirement of "unlawful purpose" includes intentional torts.14
While intentional torts are certainly unlawful, it may be difficult to consist-
ently demonstrate that the commission of a civil offense, such as libel, is
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a criminal statute. Further, similar
statutory interpretations are required if comparable standards are to be set
across the country. The use of different, existing criminal statutes, or devel-
opment of new statutes directed toward cyberbullying, may provide a more
effective outcome than this type of identity theft provision.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Schools & School Districts-Reduction-Cyber Bullying, ch. 72, sec. 1,
§ 32261, 2011 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 746 (West) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 32261).
12. § 32261(d).
13. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(r) (West 2009); Sec. 1, § 32261(d), (f)-(g), 2011
CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 746.
14. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a); Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55-57.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellant, Rolando S. (Rolando), is a juvenile citizen of Califor-
nia.15 The State of California (the State), the appellee, charged Rolando with
violating Section 530.5(a) of the California Penal Code, Committing Identity
Theft.16 Rolando received an unsolicited text message from another student
containing a female classmate's e-mail password. 17 Rolando then utilized the
password recovery feature on Facebook.18 This feature allowed Rolando to
reset the victim's password by accessing her e-mail account and entering the
"password reset code" sent by Facebook.9
Having gained access to the victim's account, Rolando posted messages,
posing as his female classmate, to other boys' accounts. 20 These messages
contained vulgar, sexually explicit language and were able to be viewed pub-
licly by other Facebook users. 21 Additionally, Rolando made changes of an
equally crude and sexual nature to the victim's own account.22 After discov-
ering this invasion of his daughter's Facebook account, the victim's father
removed the vulgarities and notified the police. 23 Rolando admitted to po-
lice that he was responsible for the changes to the victim's profile and the
messages to other Facebook users.24
III. DESCRIPTION OF CLAIMS AND HISTORY OF THE CASE
The State charged Rolando with one count of willfully obtaining per-
sonal identifying information and using it for an unlawful purpose, a viola-
tion of Section 530.5(a) of the California Penal Code.25 A juvenile petition
containing the alleged violation was filed.26 A contested jurisdiction hearing
followed, during which the juvenile court sustained the petition, concluding
beyond a reasonable doubt that Rolando committed the crime.27
15. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52; FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com.
19. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52; FACEBOOK, supra note 18.
20. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52, 58 n.2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 52.
24. Id.
25. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court denied, without prejudice,
Rolando's motion to reduce the crime from a felony to a misdemeanor.28
The juvenile court expressed concern over the short time span between this
offense and Rolando's prior offense of assault with a deadly weapon.29 On
that occasion, Rolando drove his car toward three girls, intending to scare
them.30 Ultimately, the juvenile court found Rolando guilty and determined
that the aggregated maximum sentence available for both this offense and his
prior offense was three years and three months.31 Rolando was committed to
a juvenile detention program for ninety days to one year and was put on
probation.32 Rolando appealed the juvenile court's decision, arguing that his
conduct did not satisfy the elements required by the identity theft statute. 33
The Court of Appeals, disagreeing with Rolando, upheld the juvenile court's
decision.34
IV. CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING AND OVERVIEW
OF RATIONALE
The court found that Rolando was guilty of committing identity theft for
violating Section 530.5(a).35 The statute states, in pertinent part:
Every person who willfully obtains personal identifying informa-
tion, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 530.55, of another
person, and uses that information for any unlawful purpose, in-
cluding to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, real
property, or medical information without the consent of that per-
son, is guilty of a public offense .... 36
Section 530.55(b) defines "personal identifying information," as includ-
ing passwords and other unique electronic data.37 The court analyzed Section
530.5(a) through a previously developed two-part test: (1) whether Rolando




30. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 51-52.
34. Id. at 51-52.
35. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52.
36. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.55(b) (West 2007).
38. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53 (quoting People v. Tillotson, 69 Cal. Rptr.
3d 42, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).
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Rolando argued that he did not act "willfully" in acquiring the victim's
e-mail password because it was sent to him in an unsolicited text message. 39
The California Penal Code states that, "[t]he word 'willfully,' when applied
to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose
or willingness to commit the act .... It does not require any intent to violate
law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. 40 The court, ac-
knowledging that Rolando did not request the password, nevertheless held
that he did obtain the information willfully by choosing to keep the password
and "was a free agent" when he maintained it for use in retrieving the vic-
tim's Facebook password.41 The court further held that Rolando's actions in
retrieving the Facebook password demonstrated his willful intent to gain per-
sonal identifying information.42 Using Facebook's password recovery tool is
a multi-step process. 43 Rolando first notified Facebook that "the victim" had
forgotten her password.44 Then, a verification code was sent to the victim's
e-mail address, and Rolando used the password he received through the text
message to retrieve the verification code, reset the victim's Facebook pass-
word, and ultimately access her account. 45 The court found these actions to
be satisfactory in establishing the first part of the identity theft test because
Rolando voluntarily kept the victim's e-mail password for his own future use
and subsequently used it to obtain the victim's Facebook password.46
The court next examined Rolando's contention that his use of the e-mail
password did not constitute an "unlawful purpose" as required by Section
530.5(a).47 Rolando claimed that his behavior was, "at most," a civil tort
and, as such, did not come within the statute.48 In response to Rolando's
argument, the State presented two theories: (1) Rolando's behavior was un-
lawfuli under Section 647.6(a)(1) of the California Penal Code;49 and (2) civil
torts do satisfy the unlawful purpose element of Section 530.5(a) and Ro-
lando committed libel under Section 45 of the California Civil Code.50
The court did not agree with the state's first argument. Section
647.6(a)(1) of the California Penal Code prohibits a person from "annoy[ing]
39. Id. at 53.
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1987).
41. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53.
42. Id. at 53-54.
43. FACEBOOK, supra note 19.
44. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53; FACEBOOK, supra note 19.
45. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53; FACEBOOK, supra note 19.
46. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53-54.
47. Id. at 54.
48. Id.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647.6(a)(1) (West 2006).
50. CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 1872); Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 54.
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or molest[ing] any child under 18 years of age."51 The California Supreme
Court has set forth a two-part test for this statute, requiring, "(1) conduct a
'normal person would unhesitatingly be irritated by', and (2) conduct 'moti-
vated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest' in the victim." 52 The court
held that the facts in the present case did not satisfy this test because Rolando
made no attempt to contact the victim directly, and there was no indication
that he was motivated by any sexual interest in her.53
The court, in analyzing the State's second theory, considered various
external sources when interpreting the "unlawful purpose" requirement of
Section 530.5(a) and determined that the term was to be understood as a
broad description covering a variety of offenses.54 The California Supreme
Court has further explained that "the term 'unlawful' . . . include[s] wrongful
conduct which is not criminal," including offenses under the common law.55
The court found that this definition includes intentional civil torts. 56 Section
45 of the California Civil Code defines libel as "a false and unprivileged
publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation
to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred contempt, ridicule, or oblo-
quy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency
to injure him in his occupation."57 The court determined that Rolando's post-
ings on the victim's Facebook account and her friends' profiles was suffi-
cient to "expose[ ] the victim to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy."58
A third approach to establishing the "unlawful purpose" element of Sec-
tion 530.5(a) was presented by the court: even if Rolando's conduct was not
unlawful within the meaning of that provision, it satisfied the "unlawful pur-
pose" requirement because his behavior violated Section 653m(a) of the Cal-
ifornia Penal Code.59 Section 635m(a), in pertinent part, states, "Every
person who, with an intent to annoy . . . makes contact by means of an
electronic communication device with another and addresses to or about the
other person any obscene language ... is guilty of a misdemeanor."60 Sec-
tion 635m(c) states, in pertinent part, "Any offense committed by use of an
electronic communication device or medium, including the Internet, may be
51. PENAL CODE § 647.6(a)(1).
52. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 54 (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Lo-
pez, 965 P.2d 713, 717 (Cal. 1998)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 55-57.
55. Id. at 57 (citations omitted) (quoting Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 954 (Cal. 2003)).
56. Id.
57. CIv. CODE § 45.
58. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58.
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 635m(a) (West 2009); Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58.
60. PENAL CODE § 635m(a).
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deemed to have been committed when and where the electronic communica-
tion or communications were originally sent or first viewed by the recipi-
ent."61 The court determined that, by posting as the victim and changing her
profile information, Rolando violated Section 635m(a)62 and the violation
was committed at the time he posted the information as explained by Section
635m(c).63 For these reasons, the court affirmed the juvenile court's ruling.64
V. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S APPROACH
In many ways, punishing this type of behavior as felony identity theft is
an effective means of ending cyberbullying. There is, potentially, a great
deterrent effect in imposing such seemingly severe punishment on offenders,
particularly teenagers, which will help in efforts to stop cyberbullying. One
underlying issue raised by imposing criminal punishment on cyberbullies is
whether identity theft is the proper crime to charge in these cases.
Identity theft as punishment broadens the ability of the law to step in
and provide a form of punishment for behavior that affects students both in
the online realm and at school. As in this case, many teenage victims of
similar crimes are subsequently ridiculed at school, not just online.65 One
widely debated question is whether, and to what extent, schools should be
involved in preventing and punishing cyberbullying that occurs away from
school property and outside of school hours. It seems, however, that no mea-
sure taken by schools to combat cyberbullying will be sufficient on its own
against acts occurring away from school grounds, and thus the need for crim-
inal punishment arises.
Despite the potential positive effects of imposing felony identity theft
on individuals who commit actions like those in this case, there are difficul-
ties posed by this type of punishment. One main difficulty is achieving na-
tionwide uniformity in using identity theft to punish cyberbullying. This
court's decision was based largely on careful interpretation of the specific
language in the relevant statute; however, state statutes prohibiting identity
theft are not perfectly identical and interpreting them the same way may be
difficult, if not impossible.66 This is amplified by the fact that cyberbullying,
while largely conducted by a victim's peers at her own school, is not limited
to only those individuals. The Internet allows cyberbullying to occur across
state lines, compounding the need for uniformity in this area of the law.
61. PENAL CODE § 635m(c).
62. PENAL CODE § 635m(a).
63. PENAL CODE § 635m(c); Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58.
64. Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52, 58.
65. See Hinduja, Cyberbullying: Identification, Prevention, and Response, supra
note 3.
66. See Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55-56.
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Another potential problem associated with this decision arises from the
court's interpretation of the statutory language requiring that the information
be used for "any unlawful purpose."67 The court points out that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has "defined the term 'unlawful' to include wrongful con-
duct which is not criminal," and that "an act is unlawful ... if it is proscribed
by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determi-
nable legal standard."68 This is a very broad definition that allows for the
inclusion of intentional torts, such as libel, to be punishable as identity theft
under the statute. It is evident that Rolando's actions fall within the definition
of "libel" under California law.69 The language of Section 530.5(a), and the
legislative intent underlying it, could be interpreted differently, but such ex-
amination is not the most relevant consideration here.
More pertinent is the fact that commission of an intentional civil tort,
such as libel, is supporting a felony conviction. Punishment for cyberbully-
ing is undoubtedly necessary, but using a civil tort as the basis for a felony
conviction may be an extreme measure. The deterrent effect of a criminal
punishment for cyberbullying would not be lost if it were punishable as a
misdemeanor, and many may view a felony conviction as too extreme a pun-
ishment for committing a civil tort, particularly in the case of a minor. This
may also be a factor inhibiting adoption of similar laws across the nation if
other states view this penalty as too severe for the offense committed. The
court's discussion of a violation of Section 635m(a) as satisfactory for pun-
ishment under Section 530.5(a) also raises a question as to the felony compo-
nent of Rolando's conviction.70 Section 635m(a) specifically states that its
violation would constitute a misdemeanor.71 This makes it even more diffi-
cult to see how the court can justifiably impose a felony conviction when a
similar statute, which could be used to satisfy the requirements of the statute
being considered, specifically prescribes a lesser degree of punishment.72
Also, it is questionable whether the court's interpretation of Section 635m(a)
is correctly applied in this case.73 If the statute has been misapplied, it is
uncertain what effect this might have on the same issue in the future.
Instead of basing criminal charges on civil torts, such as libel, courts
may achieve better results by applying existing criminal statutes in new and
different ways. In this case, the California court could have instead punished
Rolando under Section 528.5 of the California Penal Code,74 a different iden-
67. See id.
68. Id. at 57.
69. See Civ. CODE § 45; Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 57-58.
70. See PENAL CODE § 635m(a); Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58.
71. See PENAL CODE § 635m(a).
72. See Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58.
73. See PENAL CODE § 635m(a); Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58.
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011).
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tity theft provision. Section 528.5(a) provides that "any person who know-
ingly and without consent credibly impersonates another actual person
through or on an Internet Web site ... for purposes of harming, intimidating,
threatening, or defrauding another person is guilty of a public offense...."75
Credible impersonation occurs where "another person would reasonably be-
lieve, or did reasonably believe, that the defendant was or is the person who
was impersonated."76 The statute also defines "electronic means" as "open-
ing an e-mail account or an account or profile on a social networking Internet
Web site in another person's name."77 Rolando's actions certainly would
qualify him as a "credible" impersonator, and he definitely employed "elec-
tronic means" as defined by the definitions in Section 528.5.78 Also, Ro-
lando could easily be said to have harmed the victim by damaging her
reputation, making his behavior punishable under this section.79 This type of
statute could be more effective in punishing cyberbullies. It does not require
the use of an underlying civil tort to find guilt, a practice that may not be well
received in courts nationwide. Using a civil tort, as was done in the present
case, to justify criminal charges is arguably difficult, despite statutory inter-
pretation demonstrating it as an acceptable practice in California.80 Utilizing
a criminal statute similar to Section 528.5 may result in an outcome that is
less likely to be overturned since statutory interpretation has a subjective
component that could allow for different results dependent upon individual
perspectives.
Vl. CONCLUSION
In this case, the California Court of Appeals takes a radical approach to
punishment of cyberbullying. The court upholds the felony conviction of a
minor for identity theft. This presents an intriguing approach to combating
cyberbullying through seemingly strict, deterrent punishment. Whether the
use of felony identity theft in such cases is too severe a penalty for the com-
mission of an intentional civil tort, and whether states can, and will, be per-
suaded by this analysis to develop similar, more uniform laws to punish
cyberbullies across the country are inquiries still to be answered. As this
area of the law develops, the use of other existing criminal statutes in lieu of
ones similar to that relied upon in this case should be examined and may lead
to more effective deterrence nationwide.
75. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a).
76. PENAL CODE § 528.5(b).
77. PENAL CODE § 528.5(c).
78. PENAL CODE § 528.5(b), (c). See Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49.
79. See PENAL CODE § 528.5; Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49.
80. See Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 55-57.

